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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050264-CA
vs.

JOSHUA RICH,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing an aggravated robbery charge against

defendant based on a violation of his statutory speedy trial when defendant delivered a
request for disposition of pending charges as outlined by Utah Code Annotated §77-29-1?
The standard of review for interpreting a statute presents a question of law and is
therefore reviewed for correctness. State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App. 22, ^j 11, 997 P.2d
314, cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). See also, State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, \
4, 122 P.3d 561 (Legal determinations concerning interpretation of the 120-day
disposition statute are reviewed for correctness).
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it held that there was not good

cause for the failure of the State to try the matter within 120 days? The standard of
review for this issue is an abuse of discretion standard. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47 at *[f 4
1

(Trial court granted discretion for its reasonable determinations concerning existence of
good cause excusing failure to bring charge to trial within 120 days).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1
1.
Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or
other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver
to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the
same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is
pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have
the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice.
2.
Any warden, sheriff or custodial office, upon receipt of the demand described in
Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting
attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of
the prosecuting attorney so notified provide the attorney with such information
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested.
3.
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance.
4.
In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that failure of the
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported
by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from an order by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen, Fourth

District Judicial Court, dismissing a charge of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
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for failure of the State to have the matter tried within 120 days as required by Utah Code
Annotated § 77-29-1.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Joshua Rich was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court

on or about November 18, 2003, with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302 or, in the alternative, robbery, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-301 (R. 2).
An initial appearance was held on August 31, 2004 where the defendant was
advised of charges, penalties, and right to counsel (R. 16).
On September 29, 2004, Rich filed a Motion to dismiss, claiming that his case was
not brought to trial before the expiration of 120 days from first submission of a written
120-day Disposition to the Utah State Prison warden's agent, dated March 12, 2004 (R.
36). This, Rich claims, violated his right to a speedy and fair trial in violation of the sixth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1
(R. 35).
A preliminary hearing was held on October 12, 2004 (R. 39). Rich waived his right
to the hearing and then entered a not guilty plea. Id. His counsel, Gunda Jarvis, requested
that the court schedule oral arguments. Id.
Oral arguments were held on November 15, 2004 (R. 62). The court then took the
matter under advisement. Id.
On March 3, 2005, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss (R. 73).
On March 17, 2005, the State filed a Notice of Appeal from the entire Order of Dismissal
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in the Fourth Judicial Court of Utah County, State of Utah and this action commenced (R.
75). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently transferred this matter to this Court (R. 80).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On November 5, 2003, Rich and co-defendant Scott Wilkinson were involved in a
retail theft at Wal-Mart in which an employee was injured (R. 82: 33). Wilkinson was
arrested first and charged with retail theft (R. 82: 34. Rich was arrested within three or
four days of Wilkinson; however, he was arrested in Park City on separate charges (R. 25;
82:37). Officer Clement charged Rich with aggravated robbery or in the alternative
robbery because during the retail theft Rich caused an employee's arm to shatter in five
different places (R. 82: 34-36). Officer Clement never spoke to Rich nor was Rich ever
informed that he was charged with aggravated robbery instead of retail theft (R. 82:37).
On November 18, 2003, the Utah County Attorney's office filed Information
against Defendant charging him with Aggravated Robbery or in the alternative Robbery
(R. 2). At the time the Information was filed, Rich was serving a sentence on a prior
conviction in the Utah State Prison (R. 35-36).
On March 4, 2004, Rich filed a request for disposition of pending charges as
outlined by Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 to the Warden of the State Prison (R. 35). In
filling out the Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charge(s), Rich listed the
nature of the charges as "theft/probation violation" in the Fourth District Court of Utah
County (R. 42; 82:24; State's Exhibits #3, #5). On the line for "Case # (if known)" Rich
wrote: 021400580 which was the case number for the probation violation (R. 82:44;
State's Exhibit #5). According to Rich, he would have listed the other case number if he
had known it or if he had access to it (R. 82:46). Moreover, the only reason Rich knew
4

the case number to his probation violation was because he had already been sentenced on
it. Id. Furthermore, Rich contends that the only reason he listed his pending charge as
theft is because Wilkinson was charged with retail theft (R. 82: 39-40).
Rich's disposition request was forwarded to Alberta Smith, a records worker at the
prison who processes 120-day disposition requests and forwards them to the proper
prosecuting agency (R. 82: 5-8). On March 12, 2005, Smith received Rich's request and
forwarded it and a certificate of inmate status along with a cover letter to the Utah County
Attorney office (State's Exhibits #1-5). The cover letter referenced case number
021400580 (State's Exhibit #1). A copy of this material was also sent to the Fourth
District Court (Id.). Smith testified that disposition requests can be processed without a
case number (R. 82: 11).
The 120-day disposition demand was received by the Utah County Attorney's
office on March 25, 2005 (Date Stamp of State's Exhibit #1). Because Deputy Utah
County Attorney Tim Taylor had prosecuted case number 021400580 the disposition
paperwork w7as forwarded to his secretary, Beth Allen (R. 82: 16-18). Allen followed
office procedure and looked up the case number and pulled the file in order to designate it
as a matter that needed to be resolved within the corresponding 120 days (R. 82: 18-19).
Once Allen looked at the case, she discovered that Rich had been sentenced and the case
was finished (R. 82: 19). Accordingly, Allen did not flag the case for special attention
and refilled the matter (Id.). Allen testified that she only looked up the case number on the
disposition request and did not examine any other case involving Rich (R. 82: 22).
Allen did not give the disposition to Taylor to review (R. 82: 23). Allen also
testified that at some point she had received a reminder of office policy which indicated
that when a 120-day disposition demand is received, all cases involving the particular
5

defendant need to be examined "because sometimes, like this case, they don't list all the
case numbers and we need to make sure that they're all taken care o f (R. 82: 24-25).
Jan Barp, the secretary for Curtis Larson-the Utah County deputy prosecuting this
matter-testified that she would have received any disposition requests which referenced
the case number associated with this case (R. 82: 29-31). However, Barp testified that no
disposition requests or related paperwork concerning this aggravated robbery charge ever
crossed her desk (R. 82: 30).
The Fourth District Court also received the disposition demand paperwork (R. 81;
State's Exhibit #6). The trial court docketed and filed the paperwork in case number
021400580 and forwarded a copy to the Utah County Attorney's office (R. 81; 82: 20-21;
State's Exhibit #6).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rich asserts that he adequately specified the nature of the charge as required by
the disposition statute because theft is a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery.
A reading of the plain language of the statute does not require Rich to list the specific
name of his crime but only the nature of the charge. Moreover, Rich contends that the
statute does not require him to list any case numbers in order for his case to be brought
to trial.
Furthermore, because Rich properly specified the nature of the charge it was the
duty of the State to bring his case to trial and hence the State did not have good cause for
failing to bring his case to trial within 120 days.
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Accordingly, the trial court correctly interpreted Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1.
in addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the failure of the
State to have this matter tried within 120 days was not excused by good cause.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED § 77-29-1 IN CONCLUDING THAT RICH HAD ADEQUATELY
SPECIFIED THE NATURE OF THE CHARGE IN HIS REQUEST
FOR 120-DAY DISPOSITION
The State argues that Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 puts the initial burden on
Rich to "properly specify the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending"
(Appellant's Br. at 13). Therefore, the State argues that since Rich failed to properly
identify the nature of the charge they did not have a duty to bring Rich's aggravated
robbery case to trial within 120 days.
Rich and the trial court disagreed with this argument and the trial court concluded
that Rich specified the nature of the charge even though he "listed Theft, rather than a
Robbery" (R. 68). The trial court stated that the requirement of specifying the nature of
the charge was met because "theft is a lesser included offense of Robbery" {Id.).
Moreover, the court explained that it is "reasonable to assume that most individuals who
receive criminal charges are not astute in the law and therefore can not be expected to
know all the differing types and degrees of thefts that one could possibly be charged
with.... Or , as in this case, whether a conduct will be charged with a theft, robbery, or
aggravated robbery based upon an injury or threat of injury to another person" (R. 67).
The trial court further reasoned that the State is "in the best position to determine what
7

charges are pending against the defendant in Utah County" (R. 68). The trial court also
stated that it was not the duty of the layperson to know the differentiations between
theft, robber}7, and aggravated robbery and, therefore, Rich satisfied the requirements of
the statue by putting theft on his request for disposition. Id. Accordingly, the trial court
concluded:
... Since a layperson is not expected to make these differentiations, it is the
responsibility of the State to do more than merely check the file number provided
by a defendant. The State was responsible to insure whether there were other
theft related charges pending that carried a different file number.
Furthermore, Beth Allen, who is employed with the Utah County
Attorney's office, testified that she had received the 120-day disposition request
sent from the prison. She testified that she looked up the case number that was
provided and discovered that he had already been sentenced on the 2002 charge.
This Court finds that it was more than reasonable for the State to assume that
since defendant was charged with a probation violation in regards to the 2002
case, based upon a theft related charge that occurred in Utah County, that there
would be in fact a pending criminal charge that was separate from the 2002 theft
charge. In addition, Ms. Allen testified that she received an office reminder that
when a 120-day disposition request is received by the State that all defendant's
case numbers must be examined.
Therefore, this Court finds that the State failed to comply with the 120-day
disposition request. Furthermore, this Court finds that the State's failure to make
an adequate search of all the defendant's additional case numbers and files does
not constitute as "good cause"
8

(R. 67).
The State argues that Rich listed only one case number on his Disposition
Request and when coupled with the aggravated robbery charge identified as theft, the
State was left with only two possible interpretations. The first interpretation of the
request could be that it was a mistake "since there apparently were no unresolved
charges associated with case number 021400580 at the time the Utah County Attorney
received the request" (Appellant's Br. at 11). Secondly, it "could be interpreted as a
request to have the alleged probation violation from case number 021400580 resolved
within 120 days/'M. at 11-12.
The State further argues that neither of these possibilities implicates the
aggravated robbery charge. Id According to the State "defendant's failure to even
mention the aggravated robbery charge in his written disposition request prevents
application of section 77-29-1 to those charges." In support of this proposition the State
cites Aranza v. State. AAA S.E.2d 349 (Ga. App. 1994). In Aranza the Georgia Appellate
Court held that when a defendant fails to "identify the charges upon which he demanded
a speedy trial by name, date, term of court, or case number" the demand ""cannot
reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of a defendant's
intention to invoke the extreme sanction' of dismissal" (Appellants Br. at 12) (quoting
Aranza v. State, AAA S.E.2d at 350).
Rich asserts that Aranza is distinguishable from this case for several reasons.
One, the Georgia statute differs considerably from the Utah statute. Georgia's statute, a
copy of which contained in the Addenda, is applicable to basically all defendants while
the Utah statute (Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1) applies only to defendants serving a
term of incarceration. Georgia's statute also seemingly places the burden of bringing a
9

defendant to trial timely on the burden of the corresponding trial court while the Utah
statute places the burden on the prosecuting agency.
Two, in Aranza, the Georgia court concluded that the copy of Ihe speedy trial
demand served upon the State failed to identify the charges by "name, date, term of
court, or case number" and that therefore, it was insufficient to put the court or the State
on notice "'of a defendant's intention to invoke the extreme sanction'' of OCGA § 17-7170." Aranza, 444 S.E.2d at 350 (quoting Ferris v. State, 324 S.E.2d 762 (Ga. App.
1984).
In this case, Rich's demand which was received by the Utah County Attorney's
office specified the Fourth District Court for a theft-related charge pending in Utah
County as of March of 2005 as well as a probation violation. The case number listed
corresponded to the probation violation. Rich asserts that his disposition request
adequately specified the nature of the charge pending against him and adequately placed
the State on notice of its statutory obligation to bring the matter to trial within the
corresponding 120 days. Cf. State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) (Notice of
Appearance which contains entry of plea and request for trial is insufficient to invoke §
77-29-1 where it was not properly delivered to the warden and did not specify the nature
of the charge or the appropriate court); State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah
1987) (Letter from probation officer to county attorney making inquiry as to county's
intentions respecting prosecution of defendant was not proper invocation of 120-day
disposition statute where no charges were specified and where no information was
pending against defendant).
In addition, Rich asserts that the plain language of the statue supports the trial
court's conclusion that Rich adequately specified the nature of the pending charge
10

because theft has many variations and because theft is related to robbery as a lesser
included offense (R. 68). The plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 only
requires the nature of the charge be identified and not the specific legal name of the
charge.
In State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court of
Utah stated that a lesser included offense is included when the offense is "established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the offense charged."
The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted that to mean that where one crime cannot be
committed without necessarily committing the other than the one crime is a lesser
included offense of the greater crime. Id. In McCovey, the defendant was convicted of
second-degree felony-murder and aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court held that
these two crimes do not merge and therefore it was not double jeopardy. Id. at 1234.
However, in this case the Supreme Court did say that "theft has been held to be a lesser
included offense of aggravated robbery because theft, by its very nature, has elements
that overlap aggravated robbery." Id. at 1237.
Rich argues that since the plain language of the statue only requires that the
defendant specify the nature of the charge and not the legal name of the crime charged;
he fulfilled this requirement and, therefore, it was the duty of the State to bring the case
to trial withinl 20-day s. Moreover, Rich argues that he did specify the nature of the
charge because the Supreme Court has stated that "theft, by its very nature, has elements
that overlap aggravated robbery," therefore, meaning that theft and aggravated robbery
are very similar in nature. This, Rich contends, proves that he met the statutory
requirement because he listed the nature of the charge and the Supreme Court of Utah
has held that these two crimes are similar in nature.
11

As to the two interpretations advocated by the State, Rich contends that there is
third-more plausible-interpretation which is supported by the trial court's decision and
the testimony of Beth Allen, a secretary in the Utah County Attorney's office. This third
interpretation is that Rich listed two different charges requesting disposition and that he
listed the only case number available to him. According to Allen, she understood
"theft/probation violation" as meaning "theft" and "probation violation" (R. 82: 24).
Furthermore, Allen also testified that she was sent a reminder that when a 120-day
disposition request is received, they are to look up all the case numbers (R. 82: 24-25).
When Rich's attorney asked why this was Ms. Allen stated that it was because
"sometimes, like this case, they don't list all the case numbers and we need to make sure
that they're all taken care o f (R. 82: 25).
In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated that it was the "responsibility
of the State to do more than merely check the file number provided by a defendant. The
State was responsible to insure whether there were other theft related charges pending
that carried a different file number" (R. 67). The State concedes that the "State is better
equipped to uncover any and all charges that may be pending against a defendant"
(Appellant's Br. at 13). However, the State argues that the "current statute imposes no
such requirement on the State" and the statute places the initial burden on the defendant
to properly identify the nature of the charge. Id. at 13.
Rich contends that since he properly identified the nature of the charge, the
burden shifted to the State to bring Rich's untried charge to disposition within 120 days
from the time of delivery. In State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 1998), the
defendant appealed a conviction of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. Heaton
argued that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss his case due to noncompliance of
12

the detainer statute. Id. at 914. The Supreme Court of Utah stated that "this court has
consistently held that the language of the detainer statute clearly places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecutor." Id. Furthermore, in Heaton, the Court
referred to the Petersen case where the defendant did not object to a trial date outside the
120-day period. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's failure to
object to the trial date was irrelevant because the "burden of bringing the case to trial
within the disposition period rested solely with the prosecution." Id. The Court further
declared that in Heaton, the lower court "clearly erred in concluding that Heaton was in
the same position as was the State and therefore shared some of the responsibility to find
out why his case had not been sent to trial." Id.
Rich argues that, like Heaton, he was not in the same position as the State. Rich
contends that he was never told he was charged with aggravated robbery and his case
number was not available to him. Therefore, he did the best he could have done by
specifying the nature of the charge as theft, which is the offense for which the codefendant had been charged. The State had the ability-and the statutory
responsibility-to discover the pending aggravated robbery charge, which is related to
theft, but failed to take any steps to do so.
Accordingly, Rich asserts that the trial court properly interpreted the plain
language of Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1 as requiring that only the nature of the
charge need be specified; and that Rich's demand which listed "theft" adequately met
this statutory requirement. Because Rich's disposition request was not deficient, the
trial court correctly dismissed the charge for failure by the State to have the matter tried
within 120 days.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE STATE'S FAILURE TO BRING THIS MATTER
TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY GOOD CAUSE
Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(4) reads: "In the event the charge is not brought to
trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or
his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was
made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice."
In State v. Hankerson, 2005 UT 47, 122 P.3d 561, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that in determining whether the State's failure to bring a case to trial within statute § 7729-1, the Court will determine (1) when the "120-day period commenced and expired"
and (2) if the trial was not held within the 120-day period whether there was good cause
for delay. 2005 UT 47 at ^j 6. Furthermore, the Court held that in determining whether
there is good cause a "trial court must have sufficient evidence to support a finding that,
but for the defendant's actions, the trial would have been brought within the required
disposition period." Id. at^f 12.
The State contends that "all of the delay in bringing the aggravated robbery charge
to trial within 120 days of the Disposition Request is attributable to defendant. 'But for'
defendant's characterization of the nature of the offense as 'theft/probation violation' and
his use of the case number from his 2002 theft conviction, the Utah County Attorney's
Office would have brought the aggravated robbery charge to trial within 120 days"
(Appellant's Br. at 16). And that accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in
dismissing the charge (Id.).
14

However, the State overlooks the statutory responsibility placed upon the
prosecuting agency to have the matter brought to trial in a timely fashion. Rich's
disposition request, as established in Point I, adequately specified the nature of the charge
as required by statute. It was further delivered to the proper prison authority and
specified the correct court and the correct county or prosecuting agency. Accordingly, it
was the responsibility of the State to have the matter tried within the corresponding 120
days.
The State's argument also fails to address the trial court's reasoned determinations
concerning whether the failure of the prosecuting agency to comply with the statute was
supported by good cause:
.... The State is in the best position to determine what charges are pending against
the defendant in Utah County. It is reasonable to assume that most individuals
who receive criminal charges are not astute in the law and therefore cannot be
expected to know all the differing types and degrees of thefts that one could
possibl) be charged with. A person could be charged with theft or shoplifting with
differing degrees based upon value amount or prior convictions.... Or, as in this
case, whether a conduct will be charged with a theft, robbery, or aggravated
robbery based upon an injury or threat of injury to another person. Since a
layperson is not expected to make these differentiations, it is the responsibility of
the State to do more than merely check the file number provided by a defendant.
The State was responsible to insure whether there were other theft related charges
pending that carried a different file number.
Furthermore, Beth Allen, who is employed with the Utah County Attorney's
office, testified that she had received the 120-day disposition request sent from the
15

prison. She testified that she looked up the case number that was provided and
discovered that he had already been sentenced on the 2002 charge. This Court
finds that it was more than reasonable for the State to assume that since defendant
was charged with a probation violation in regards to the 2002 case, based upon a
theft related charge that occurred in Utah County, that there would be in fact a
pending criminal charge that was separate from the 2002 theft charge. In addition,
Ms. Allen testified that she received an office reminder that when a 120-day
disposition request is received by the State that all defendant's case numbers must
be examined.
(R. 67). Alien-as an employee of the prosecuting agency-was aware of Rich's
disposition request. She was aware that both theft and a probation violation were
specified on that request as "untried criminal charges." And Allen was aware of office
procedure to examine all case numbers when a 120-day disposition request is received.
Yet Allen failed to insure that a check was done on Rich's cases and as a result, the
request got filed and no action was taken by the State.
Based upon the foregoing reasonable determinations, the trial court concluded that
the "State's failure to make an adequate search of all the defendant's additional case
numbers and files does not constitute 'good cause'" (R. 67).
Rich asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
failure of the State to have this matter tried within 120 days was not supported by good
cause. The Utah Supreme Court has previously held that a trial court is granted discretion
for its reasonable determinations concerning the existence of good cause. Hanker son,
2005 UT 47 at <[ 4. Rich asserts that the trial court's determinations concerning good
cause were reasonable and therefore, do not constitute an abuse of discretion.
16

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Rich asks that this court to affirm the decision of the trial court in dismissing this
matter for failure of the State to comply with his demand for 120-day disposition.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of December, 2005.

Margaret^P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

/ / ~
£/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to Brett Delporto, Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General. 160
East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City. UT 84114, this 27lh day
of December. 2005.
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Executive Pirector
Scott V. C a r v e r
Division Pirector

P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
(801)576-7000

12 M a r c h

2004

jjtah County District Attorney
100 East Center Street #2100
provo, UT 84606

RE: RICH, Joshua Samuel
USP# 35878 D.O.B. 05/12/81
YOUR CASE # 0 2 1 4 0 0 5 8 0

pear Sirs:
ytRTMRS/MS Joshua Samuel Rich is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison.
He/She is requesting disposition of untried charges of Theft and Probation Violation,
pending in your jurisdiction. Enclosed is the appropriate paperwork to process his
request.
Thank you for your assistance with this matter.
gincerely,

by: Alberta Smith
Records Office Tech III
institutional Operations

End. (2)
cc:

Fourth District Court Clerk-Provo
Inmate File

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CERTIFICATE OF INMATE STATUS
120-DAY DISPOSITION
TO:

Utah County D i s t r i c t

RE:

RICH, Joshua Samuel
Inmate Name

Attorney

358 78
USP#

TERM of COMMITMENT: Forgery 0-5 yrs.

TIME SERVED:
TIME REMAINING:

**time calculated

Approx 0 0 year(s) 01 mo
Approx. 04 year(s) 11 mo

may not include

toll

time/credit

time

served**

PAROLE ELIGIBILITY: scheduled for parole 00/00/00

BOARD OF PARDONS
DECISION:

Hearing set for 00/00/00

Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
Utah State Prison
P. 0. Box 250
Draper, UT
84020
cc: file

I A H JUJiFAKlMbWr OF CORRECT^

T

S

NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGE(5)

TO:

DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS

Notice is hereby given that I,
(Inmate Name)do hereby request final disposition. Charge(s) of
are now
pending against me in the
"V"^ Qi^^M^
Court,
(prosecuting
brought by
UTAtf
CW/OVH
agency e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc. in the State of
tc
Utah) and request is hereby made that you forward this notice to
the appropriate authorities together with such information as
required by law.

f

Dated this '°f

day of j M W

W ^

(Month / Year)

Inmate's Name

USP#

*****************************************************************

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I have^ received a copy of the foregoing
notice t h i s /ffi^day of "IfJCUdAOsffi*/ (Month / Year) .

fr^t
Authorized Agent, DIO Record Unit
USP, PO Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020
CUCF, PO Box 898, Gunnison, Utah 84634

ftp m

CO

< >

CO

-A

n in

.1 .»'-', ts

O

4"'
^QZZl'f'-

(Revised 10/2000)
(TMF 05/05.06,C)

DIVISION OF INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
TO*

FROM:

R e^orUs
DIO Record Unit

O ) Draper ( ) CUCF

DATE:
SUBJECT: fc*fc 120-Day Disposition
( ) 180-Day Disposition
RE: Inmate Name : y_ j (Sjftj A

K-I^rf

USP Number: 3S~8^/~E
Please fill in the following information:
Prosecuting Agency
(e.g., county, city, Attorney General, etc.)
County

State

{JTPT&

Crime(s)
Case # (if known)
*****************************************************************

120-Day Dispositions:
180-Day Dispositions:

For untried criminal charges within the
State of Utah.
For untried criminal charges out of the
state for which a detainer has been filed
against an inmate.

***********************************

Please read and sign the attached documents. (2 pages)
Please attach a signed and appropriately witnessed Inmate Money
Transfer (certified mailing cost to send disposition) with the
amount section on the money transfer BLANK.
Return this letter and all attached documents to the DIO Record
Unit Supervisor at the site Records Office.
(Revised 10/2000)
(TMF OR/OS.OS,B)

FILED

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
/•-/o-nr-

or

Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 031404393
vs.
Date: January 10, 2005
JOSHUA SAMUEL RICH,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On May 8, 2002, the Defendant was convicted of a Theft, a Third Degree Felony in case
#021400580. On June 26, 2002, the Defendant was placed on probation and was ordered
to serve time in jail.

2.

On October 21, 2003, the Defendant was arrested on November 7, 2004 for Forgery
charges from Summit County, Utah.

3.

On November 18, 2003, Utah County Attorney's office filed an Information against
Defendant charging him with Aggravated Robbery or in the alternative Robbery for
conduct that occurred in Utah County on November 5, 2004.

4.

On January 27, 2004, the Defendant was sentenced in the Third District Court, Summit
County for the Forgery charge, to which he was ordered to serve 0-5 years in the Utah
State Prison.

5.

On March 4, 2004 a Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges(s) was
completed by an authorized agent of the warden, Alberta Smith. The Defendant

requested a 120 day disposition of all charges of Theft/Probation Violation that were
pending against in the Fourth District Court, brought by the Utah County Attorney's
office.
6.

On March 8, 2004, Ms. Smith completed a Division of Institutional Operations Office
Memorandum, which list the crimes of Theft/Probation Violation, as will as referencing
the case #021400580.

7.

On March 12, 2004, a letter was drafted by Ms. Smith, addressed to the Utah County
District Attorney's office, whereby providing notice of the 120 disposition request foi all
pending charges of Theft and Probation Violation. Again, the only case number listed was
at of #021400580.

8.

A copy of the cover letter, Certificate of Inmate Status, and Notice and Request For
Disposition of Pending Charges(s) were received by the Utah County Attorney's office on
March 25, 2004.

9.

On September 21, 2004, in open court, State's counsel first became aware of the 120
disposition request.

10.

On September 29, 2004, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case because it was
not brought to trial before the expiration of the 120 disposition notice.

11.

On October 15, 2004, the State filed a Motion in Opposition by stating that the State did
not receive notice, since the Defendant failed to list the correct case number

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The State contends that the Defendant did not specify the nature of the charge because he
listed pending charges as Theft, whereas he had been charged with Aggravated Robbery, or in the
alternative Robbery. The Defendant asserts that the State had a duty to conduct a thorough
search to determine any and all types of theft-related charges that were pending. This Court finds
that the Defendant did specify the nature of the charge. Although the Defendant listed Theft,
rather than a Robbery, theft is a lesser included offense of Robbery. The State in the best position
to determine what charges are pending against the defendant in Utah County. It is

reasonable to assume that most individuals who receive criminal charges are not astute in the law
and therefore can not be expected to know all the differing types and degrees of thefts that one
could possibly be charged with. A person could be charged with a theft or shoplifting with
differing degrees based upon value amount or prior convictions. A person could be charged with
differing degrees of burglary based upon whether the defendant entered a residence or a business.
Or, as in this case, whether a conduct will be charged with a theft, robbery, or aggravated robbery
based upon an injury or threat of injury to another person. Since a layperson is not expected to
make these differentiations, it is the responsibility of the State to do more than merely check the
file number provided by a defendant. The State was responsible to insure whether there were
other theft related charges pending that carried a different file number.
Furthermore, Beth Allen, who is employed with the Utah County Attorney's office,
testified that she received the 120-day disposition request sent from the prison. She testified that
she looked up the case number that was provided and discovered that he had already been
sentenced on the 2002 theft charge. This Court finds that it was more than reasonable for the
State to assume that since the defendant was charged with a probation violation in regards to the
2002 case, based upon a theft related charge that occurred in Utah County, that there would be in
fact a pending criminal charge that was separate from the 2002 theft charge. In addition, Ms.
Allen testified that she received an office reminder that when a 120-day disposition request is
received by the State that all the defendant's case numbers must be examined.
Therefore, this Court finds that the State failed to comply with the 120-day disposition
request. Furthermore, this Court finds that the State's failure to make an adequate search of all
the defendant's additional case numbers and files does not constitute as "good cause."

CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented to the Court in the parties' motions and oral arguments
this Courtfindsthat the State was provided with a written demand to have the pending charge
brought to trial with 120 days Since the charge was not properly disposed of within the 120 day
period, the charge shall be dismissed This Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the Court's
signature

DATED this

/^

day of January, 2005

BY THE COURT

'V
STEVEN L HANSEN, JUDGE

1

Georgia Code Annotated § 17-7-170
a) Any person against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for
an offense not affecting the person's life may enter a demand for trial at the court term at which
the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; or, by
special permission of the court, he or she may at any subsequent court term thereafter demand a
trial. In either case, the demand for trial shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the
prosecutor and upon the judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case is not assigned, upon
the chief judge of the court in which the case is pending. The demand shall be binding only in the
court in which the demand is filed, except where the case is transferred from one court to another
without a request from the defendant.

(b) If the person is not tried when the demand is made or at the next succeeding regular court
term thereafter, provided at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the
person, the person shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the
indictment or accusation. For purposes of computing the term at which a misdemeanor must be
tried under this Code section, there shall be excluded any civil term of court in a county in which
civil and criminal terms of court are designated; and for purposes of this Code section it shall be
as if such civil term was not held.

(c) Any demand filed pursuant to this Code section shall expire at the conclusion of the trial or
upon the defendant entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(d) If a case in which a demand for trial has been filed, as provided in this Code section, is
reversed on direct appeal, a new demand for trial must be filed within the term of court in which
the remittitur from the appellate court is received by the clerk of court or at the next succeeding
regular court term thereafter.

(e) If the case in which a demand for trial has been filed as provided in this Code section results
in a mistrial, the case shall be tried at the next succeeding regular term of court.

1.

